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A plaintiff sued Wal-Mart for injuries she sustained at one of Wal-Mart’s stores while acting within the course and scope of her employment with Acosta, Inc. The trial court found Wal-Mart liable for the plaintiff’s injuries. Under California Labor Code sections 3852 and 3856, appellant Hartford Accident & Indemnity Company (Hartford) applied for a lien on the plaintiff’s judgment to obtain reimbursement for the California workers’ compensation benefits it paid her. Although the judgment included compensation for her medical expenses, it did not include compensation for her lost wages. The court granted Hartford a lien on the judgment but reduced the lien amount.

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In August 2012, the plaintiff was working for Acosta when she fell and injured herself on Wal-Mart’s premises. Hartford was Acosta’s workers’ compensation insurer and paid the victim more than $152,000 in benefits, including more than $115,000 in medical expenses and roughly $37,000 in temporary disability indemnity for her lost wages.

In July 2014, following a three-day bench trial, the court found Wal-Mart 100 percent at fault and entered judgment against Wal-Mart for $355,000, including $178,000 in past medical expenses, $102,000 in future medical expenses, and $75,000 in past and future pain and suffering. Although the complaint sought lost wages and earning capacity, the court did not award her damages for these items because she did not ask for them at trial.

A plaintiff was hit by a car as he crossed a street between defendant Grace Family Church and the church’s parking lot. He sued the church for negligence, alleging that the church was negligent in breaching its duty of care to help him safely cross the street. The trial court granted the church’s motion for summary judgment. The Third District Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s decision in this California premises liability case, and last month, the California Supreme Court reversed the appeals court’s decision and remanded the case.

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In his initial lawsuit, the plaintiff alleged that the church owed him a duty of care to help him cross the street. The church responded that it had no control over the public street and thus did not owe a duty to prevent the plaintiff’s injury, contending that landowners have no duty to protect others from dangers on adjacent streets unless the owner created the danger.

Before the state supreme court, the parties stipulated that the church did not control the street and did not create the dangers on the street. But the church, the plaintiff argued, by directing the plaintiff to park there, foreseeably increased the likelihood that the plaintiff would cross the street and become injured. Thus, the circumstances differed from those in which a landowner simply owns property next to a public street.

The sole proprietor of a property management company, independent contractor plaintiff, was assaulted by two young men while on the premises of an apartment building he managed for the owner, defendant Kavian LLC. He sued the defendant and its two co-managing members (Mr. H.) for negligence and breach of contract. This blog post will focus solely on the negligence issue.

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At trial, the plaintiff alleged that the defendants were negligent in urging plaintiff to return to the property after an earlier disturbance and failing to provide a safe working environment. The trial court sustained demurrers by Mr. H., and granted defendant Kavian LLC’s motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff appealed the latter ruling, and the Second District Court of Appeals affirmed.

On appeal, the plaintiff’s first argument was that he was never the employee of an independent contractor, and therefore was not barred from relief under Privette v. Superior Court (1993). The appeals court held that he was incorrect.

The plaintiff sued defendant Target for injuries due to the defendant’s negligence. The plaintiff claimed she was cut by a plastic price tag holder that was sticking out into the aisle. The jury returned a verdict in the defendant’s favor, finding there was no dangerous condition. Finding that the appellate record and the plaintiff’s briefs were inadequate for appellate review, the Second District Court of Appeal affirmed in this California premises liability case.

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At trial, the plaintiff’s husband testified that he and his wife were shopping at the Burbank Target in September 2010. As the plaintiff was pushing her cart through the shoe department, she cut her pinky finger on a price tag sign that was extending horizontally into the aisle. The plaintiff attempted to complete an incident report but was told by the defendant’s staff that there were no blank forms for her to complete. Her husband later called the store to report the incident and left a message, but his call was never returned.

The defendant’s employees testified that a guest would not be denied a guest incident report and that a report would have been completed by the defendant’s staff if an incident was reported and the guest did not wish to complete a form. There was no report completed by anyone for the alleged incident. They also testified to their procedures of sweeping for hazards in the store and stated that it was impossible for a price tag sign to extend horizontally into an aisle.

On October 1, 2017, a gunman opened fire on a crowd of concertgoers at the Route 91 Harvest music festival on the Las Vegas strip. The gunman fired hundreds of rifle rounds from his suite on the 32nd floor of the Mandalay Bay hotel. The shooting left 58 people dead and 546 injured, making it the deadliest mass shooting committed by an individual in the United States. A California college student who was injured at the shooting recently filed suit against the concert promoter, the Mandalay Bay hotel owners, and the bump stock manufacturers. The case may have some relevance to certain California premises liability cases that may arise in these tragic situations.

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The lawsuit claims that MGM Resorts International, which owns both the hotel and the concert venue, failed to respond in a timely manner to the shooting of a hotel security officer who had gone to the 32nd floor to check on an alert from another guest room and who was shot six minutes before the massacre began. The lawsuit also questions why hotel staff failed to notice the gunman’s behavior prior to the mass shooting.

Specifically, the plaintiff claims that MGM Resorts and concert promoter Live Nation breached their duty of reasonable care and knew or should have known that it was reasonably foreseeable that a breach of their duty to keep the concert venue safe could result in serious or fatal injuries to concert attendees. Specifically, the gunman brought in 10 suitcases of weapons and over 500 rounds, and he barricaded himself in his room without any staff noticing.

Two people recently filed a California premises liability claim based on an alleged beating in the Dodger Stadium parking lot following a 2015 playoff game. The victim claims to have suffered a traumatic brain injury from the attack. The plaintiffs filed suit in L.A. Superior Court against the Dodgers and the two alleged attackers. The lawsuit claims negligence, negligent hiring, premises liability, intentional infliction of emotional distress, battery, assault, and loss of consortium. The victim’s wife claims she has lost the companionship and love of her husband since he was injured.

Mets fan
According to court documents, the victim attended the first game of the National League Division Series on October 9, 2015 against the Mets. He is a Dodgers fan, but his cousin, also in attendance, is a Mets fan who wore a Mets hat.

The Mets won the game. The victim and his friends left the stadium at around 10 p.m. Outside, they were confronted by the assailants, who shouted vulgarities at the group. By the time the group reached the handicapped parking area, the assailants began to “brutally attack” him. One of them allegedly struck the victim in the head. Losing consciousness, he fell to the pavement. The assailants nonetheless began to kick the victim while he lay unconscious on the ground.

Plaintiffs appealed from a judgment following a jury verdict in favor of the defendant in a California elder abuse action arising from the medical care and death of an elderly woman. On appeal, they challenged the special verdict form, the jury instructions, the exclusion of evidence, and the conduct of the jury. The Third District California Court of Appeal affirmed.

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The decedent had chronic obstructive pulmonary disease and pneumonia. Upon admission to the defendant’s facility, her life expectancy was at most a “few months,” her chance of leaving the hospital was “darned close to zero,” and she would never “continuously” be off a ventilator. According to one expert, her life expectancy at the time of her admission “would be a few months only if aggressive measures were taken that most physicians would not conscience in a patient because of the pain and suffering it caused the patient. It only lasted for a few months because they persisted in care that I know they didn’t want to give.”

Since the decedent was on a ventilator, her arterial blood gas had to be monitored. The defendant did this by using needles, rather than an arterial line (a fixed line inserted into an artery) from which blood could be tapped and then tested. Using needles was more difficult than in an ordinary patient because of the decedent’s extreme bodily swelling. But expert testimony showed that inserting an arterial line would have required cutting into the decedent and exposing her to infection—to which she was already woefully prone—and that the decision whether or not to use so-called “blind sticks” fell within a physician’s standard of care. Furthermore, the decision did not harm the decedent.

While riding his bicycle, a victim collided with the door of a driver’s personal vehicle when the driver opened the door. The bicyclist sued the driver and the driver’s employer, alleging negligence and respondeat superior liability. The lower court granted summary judgment in the employer’s favor on the ground that the “going and coming” rule barred employer liability for this California bicycle accident during his commute to work. The bicyclist argued the defendant did not meet its initial burden of production on summary judgment to show the going and coming rule applied. He further argued triable issues of material fact existed as to the rule’s applicability here. The California Court of Appeal for the Fourth District held that whether the going and coming rule applied in this case could not be decided as a matter of law; therefore, it reversed the summary judgment.

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On October 16, 2014, the driver drove his personally owned Chevrolet Suburban from his home and parked on Brandywine Ave. He stayed in his personal vehicle for a few minutes to gather his phone, wallet, and other items. The victim was riding his bicycle and struck the door of the driver’s personal vehicle as soon as the driver opened it.

He filed suit, alleging he suffered injuries during the accident and pleading a respondeat superior theory. The employer moved for summary judgment on the grounds that it was not liable for the injuries under respondeat superior, and undisputed facts showed the going and coming rule barred the claim. They stated that “Hunt did not have a fixed office location that he commuted to on a regular basis, but instead as a territory manager for A-Z Bus, would regularly drive to his rental vehicle to make sales calls. As such, his company-reimbursed rental vehicle was his ‘fixed place of business’ and his commute to and from the rental car was his normal commute that fell under the going and coming rule.”

A plaintiff brought a lawsuit against Valencia-Penales Care Services, Inc. and two individuals in connection with injuries she incurred from a fall. The matter proceeded to a jury trial. The plaintiff appealed from a judgment and order denying her motion for a new trial, contending that the non-economic damages she was awarded by the jury were inadequate. The California Court of Appeal for the First District disagreed and affirmed the judgment.

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In January 2015, the plaintiff was living alone in an apartment at Redwood Retirement, an adult living facility. She was 91 years old, suffered from macular degeneration, and at times used a cane or walker. She fell while getting back into her car after visiting the store with her caretaker. One of the issues at trial was her mental and physical condition before and after her fall.

The jury found no negligence on the part of the individual defendants, but it rendered a verdict for the plaintiff on her negligence claim against Valencia-Penales. The jury apportioned 45% of the responsibility for her harm to Valencia-Penales. It awarded the plaintiff her requested past economic damages totaling $44,506.65, future economic damages in the amount of $126,000 for caregiving services, and $5,000 for non-economic damages.

A woman and her daughter were in two automobile accidents. One defendant rear-ended them in the first. In the second, another defendant broadsided them while they were driving together two months later. The plaintiffs sued both defendants, and by the time of trial, both defendants had admitted the accidents were their fault; the defendants, however, disputed the accidents caused the full range of injuries the plaintiffs claimed to have suffered.

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The trial court barred the plaintiffs’ neuropsychologist expert witness from opining the traumatic brain injury allegedly suffered by the mother was caused by the accidents because the plaintiffs did not give adequate notice the expert would offer such an opinion and because the expert was in any event incompetent to offer such an opinion. Concluding there was no other substantial evidence that either accident was the cause of her asserted traumatic brain injury and lower back injury, the court later granted the defendants’ motions seeking nonsuit as to those injuries. The appeals court was asked to decide whether the trial court abused its discretion in excluding the plaintiffs’ expert testimony, and whether the trial court properly granted the defendants’ nonsuit motions. For the following reasons, the appeals court affirmed the lower court’s decision.

The appeals court first held that the plaintiffs’ failure to designate the expert to testify on causation was a sufficient ground to exclude his testimony on that topic. The plaintiffs contended the “plain language” of their expert witness declaration gave sufficient notice that he would testify as to the cause of the victim’s alleged traumatic brain injury. Specifically, the plaintiffs quoted language from their expert witness declaration stating that the expert “will express opinions concerning the nature and extent of [the victim’s] injuries sustained in the subject accidents.” That language, the appeals court held, did not suffice to comply with the requirements of the Code of Civil Procedure’s expert disclosure statutes. The terms “nature” and “extent” refer to the type of an injury or its characteristics, as well as perhaps its severity. That, the court explained, is distinct from the concept of causation.

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